Intra-Industry Trade, Global Supply Chains and the Political Economy of Preferential Trade Liberalization

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Motivation and research questions

Proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)

Data from www.designoftradeagreements.org (Dür et al. 2014).
Motivation and research questions

What we want to know:

- Who manages to shape these agreements?
- Who wins and who loses?
- Particularly relevant given the TTIP and TPP negotiations
Our contribution

Concrete research question:

- Which role do intra-industry trade (IIT) and global supply chains (GSCs) play in the political economy of PTAs?
  - IIT has been increasing for many years according to most measures
  - Trade in intermediates accounts for two-thirds of imports for most OECD countries
- We argue that the two developments interact in shaping the political economy of PTASs and use an original dataset on tariff concessions in PTAs to test this argument
Argument

Difference between finished goods and intermediates:

- Firms increasingly offshore parts of the production process (vertical specialization)
- Creates trade in intermediates that can take place within a firm or at arm’s length (“contract manufacturers”)
- Trade barriers on intermediate goods become a major obstacle for firms that import them (cumulative effects)
- Companies involved in GSCs can be expected to push for the liberalization of trade in intermediate goods
- As we do not see a similar constituency demand the liberalization of finished goods, the political economy of trade liberalization differs for finished goods and intermediates
Argument

Conventional argument about IIT applies for finished goods:

• If IIT is low, the adjustment costs for import-competitors are high; they strongly oppose liberalization

• If IIT is high, import-competitors are less concerned (Helpman 1981; Krugman 1981; Lipson 1982; Milner 1997; Manger 2015)

• An increase in IIT increases net demand for trade liberalization of finished goods
Argument

This argument should not hold for intermediates:

• Demand for liberalization from downstream industries should be higher if IIT is low than if IIT is high
  - If IIT is low, downstream industries tend to be unified in their support of trade liberalization
  - If IIT is high, downstream industries will be divided (those sourcing abroad benefit from trade liberalization; those sourcing domestically are either indifferent or support tariffs e.g. because a tariff reduction would benefit their competitors)
  - Domestic producers of intermediates are either concerned about direct competition (low IIT) or about competitive pressure on their downstream users (high IIT)

• An increase in IIT reduces net demand for trade liberalization
Argument

From trade policy demands to trade policy supply:

• Assumption that decision-makers follow societal demands when designing trade agreements

• This can be a result of lobbying or because decision-makers try to preempt lobbying

Hypothesis:

Whereas more IIT facilitates the liberalization of finished goods, this is not the case for intermediate goods.
Our data:

- We use tariff concessions in PTAs to test our argument
- Tariff liberalization remains a key element of PTAs
- Some tariffs are liberalized immediately, others are liberalized after a few years, still others are completely exempted
- PTAs ideal testing ground because IIT is dyadic
Research design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Our data</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Original dataset containing the tariff concessions exchanged in 61 PTAs at the 6 digit HS level</td>
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<td>- The DESTA project (Dür et al. 2014)</td>
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<td>- Australia, Canada, China, European Union, Japan, South Korea and the United States</td>
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<td>- 1995 to 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>• 158 tariff schedules with around 5,000 tariff lines each</td>
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<tr>
<td>- WITS alone not sufficient! (and WITS coverage considerably worse than ours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Around 800,000 observations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Average tariff levels over time, by major trading entity.

- Australia
- China
- Canada
- EC
- Korea
- USA
Research design

Average tariff levels over time, by economic sector.
Research design

Share of tariff lines with zero duties.
Dependent variables

First-year cut as % of tariff rate
t_{min1} = (t_{min1} - t_0)/t_{min1}

(Proportional cut)

Years needed for tariff to go to zero
(Time to zero)
Estimation

- OLS regression (fractional regression as robustness check for first-year cut)
- Clustered standard errors at the HS6 level
- We drop tariff lines that are zero at tmin. In robustness checks, we use a Heckman selection model to deal with the resulting selection effect.
Predictors

Good type:

- Final vs. intermediate and mixed (Francois and Pindyuk 2012 and Bekkers et al. 2012)

![Graph showing the proportion of tariff lines that concern intermediates across different categories of goods.](image)
Predictors

**Intra-industry trade:**
- Simultaneous imports and exports of a good
- Measured at the HS6 level
- IIT missing to control for missing observations
Control variables

- Tariff level at tmin1
- Imports
- GDP per capita (countries A and B)
- GDP (combined)
- Democracy
- WTO membership
- In some models: fixed effects for country A, country B, PTA, year and HS2 sector
The additive results

N=516,954

N=525,632

Coefficient
Testing the hypothesis

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Testing the hypothesis

![Graph showing coefficient (Intermediate good x IIT) for various countries including Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Korea, China, Colombia, Jordan, Peru, Panama, Guatemala, USA, Dominican Republic, Croatia, El Salvador, Morocco, Laos, Malaysia, Australia, Vietnam, Turkey, Thailand, Japan, Pakistan, EC, Chile, Cambodia, South Africa, Canada, Israel, Philippines, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Iceland, Oman, Tunisia, New Zealand.](image-url)
Differentiated good as proxy for IIT

- Homogeneous versus differentiated goods (Rauch 1999)
Differentiated good as proxy for IIT

Proportional cut

Time to zero

Finished

Intermediate

Finished

Intermediate

Differentiated good

Linear Prediction

Differentiated good

Linear Prediction

Overview Argument Research design Results Robustness Conclusion
Trade elasticity as proxy for IIT

- Trade elasticity captures the extent to which prices react to imports
- Low elasticity is an indication of high IIT
- Import demand elasticities by country at the 3 digit level from Broda et al. 2006

![Graph showing trade elasticity by section for China and USA](image)

- Mean trade elasticity for China: 1.39
- Mean trade elasticity for USA: 0.94
Trade elasticity as proxy for IIT

Proportional cut

Time to zero

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Is the effect driven by primary commodities?

Data for primary commodity from Basu 2011.
Conclusion

Key findings

• Neither IIT nor GSCs unambiguously facilitate trade liberalization; rather:
  • For finished goods, IIT facilitates trade liberalization; for intermediates, it does not
  • At low levels of IIT, GSCs facilitate trade liberalization; at high levels, they do not
• The most productive companies that source differentiated intermediates abroad do not see their preferences reflected in trade policy
• Rather, the potential losers seem to be key in understanding tariff concessions in PTAs
Many thanks!
Bibliography


Bibliography


