{"id":1602,"date":"2023-02-13T16:19:18","date_gmt":"2023-02-13T16:19:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.fiw.ac.at\/publications\/when-does-tit-for-tat-diplomacy-in-trade-policy-pay-off\/"},"modified":"2023-02-13T16:19:18","modified_gmt":"2023-02-13T16:19:18","slug":"when-does-tit-for-tat-diplomacy-in-trade-policy-pay-off","status":"publish","type":"publication","link":"https:\/\/www.fiw.ac.at\/en\/publications\/when-does-tit-for-tat-diplomacy-in-trade-policy-pay-off\/","title":{"rendered":"(When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?"},"content":{"rendered":"\nIn international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit-for-tat in trade policy. By highlighting various strategies in a (linear) partial-equilibrium framework, we show that retaliation of non- cooperative behavior by limiting market access works as a disciplining device independently of supply and demand parameters. Our theoretical results are backed by empirical evidence that countries more frequently involved in WTO-mediated disputes entailing tit-for-tat strategies pursue on average more liberal trade regimes.\n\n","protected":false},"featured_media":0,"menu_order":0,"template":"","jelcode":[860,858,859],"keyword":[861,863,862,864],"class_list":["post-1602","publication","type-publication","status-publish","hentry","jelcode-d740","jelcode-f130","jelcode-f510","keyword-int-political-economy","keyword-tit-for-tat","keyword-trade-policy-conflicts","keyword-wto-dispute-settlement"],"acf":{"year":2012,"month":5,"day":"","volume":"","number":"085","pages":45,"reviewed":"0","citeid":"FIW_WP_085","fiwseries":"FIW Working Papers","event":null},"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v23.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>(When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off? - FIW<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.fiw.ac.at\/en\/publications\/when-does-tit-for-tat-diplomacy-in-trade-policy-pay-off\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"(When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off? - FIW\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on contingent protection aka tit-for-tat in trade policy. 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